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AHMED SHEIKH*

The Legal Competence of
United Nations in the Area of
Peace-Keeping-

A Reappraisal

There is no lack of agreement among the scholars in the discipline and
the delegates to the U.N. as to the significance of the legal basis of the
United Nations peace-keeping activities. The question of legal limits to the
use of force by the world organization has been debated before in the
international arena and no doubt will come up again and again, for it is
directly related to the future effectiveness of the organization in keeping
world peace.
Several times in the last two decades or so, the United Nations has
authorized military forces to deal with a threat to peace. In each instance
there were some who have pointed out that the U.N. operation may have
averted a third world war. But in each instance there were others who have
argued that perhaps the world organization is not equipped, within the
constitutional framework of the Charter, to deal with such actual or potential threats to world peace. 1 There are still others who have argued, and
convincingly, that the present stalemate stems from the basic
differences among the members in the interpretation of the Charter with
regard to the legal limits of U.N. activity on behalf of international peace.
They further point out that the Soviet Union and France are the chief
exponents of a "strict constructionist" view of the Charter. That is, the
Charter, being a treaty between sovereign states, should be read simply as
conferring only those powers upon the U.N.'s various organs which are
explicitly stated.
All moves which have the slightest appearance of having been designed
to extend the powers of any U.N. organ beyond those explicitly given to
*Associate Professor, Dept. of Political Science, Western Illinois Univ., B.A., M.A.
(Sacramento State College), M.A., Ph.D. (Univ. of Oregon).
'Consider, for example, Brazilian delegates' repeated urgings that the U.N. Charter must
be revised to "provide for a new chapter on peace-keeping operations" U.N. Doc. A/AC
121/PV. 33, March 29, 1968. p. 2.
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them by the Charter are regarded as illegal so long as they are not formally
approved by all parties. All powers beyond those expressly granted to the
U.N. organs are reserved to the 'Member States and can be exercised by
the U.N. only if and when an expressed consent of the members has been
2
obtained.
On the other hand, it is argued that there are a number of countries led
by the United States and a number of other nations which have, at times
reluctantly, but nevertheless supported the General Assembly's right to
call for peace-keeping forces in emergencies, and particularly if the Security Council has been incapacitated by the usage of veto. These countries
also defend the Assembly's right to apportion expenses of all
'peace-keeping operations whether initiated by the General Assembly or
the Security Council, and proceed to demand payments. 3 Followers of this
school are in full agreement on the Council's right to take the initiative in
peace-keeping activities of all sorts. In fact, they insist that the Security
Council has the primary responsibility in this area, but they maintain that
they have turned to the Assembly only when the Council was unable to
take action in grave crisis situations calling for a peace-keeping force. They
also believe that the General Assembly has the right to apportion expenses
4
of such operations on the basis of Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Charter.
Despite the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, affirmed
by 9-5 votes of the judges in July 1962, 5 that the expenditures authorized
by the General Assembly for operations in the Congo and the Middle East
were "expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of Article 17,
paragraph 2 of the U.N. Charter, and despite the acceptance of this
opinion in the General Assembly, 6 and the resolution entitled "General
Principles to Serve as Guidelines for the Sharing of the Costs of Future

2

For a comprehensive discussion of this point, see U.N. Doc. A/AC. 121 /WG. A/PV. 2,
March 22, 1967, pp. 11-13; See also Issues before the 22nd General Assembly, INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION, No. 564 (September, 1967) pp. 28-33; FINANCING OF UNITED
NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS:

REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON THE EXAM-

INATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND BUDGETARY PROCEDURES OF THE UNITED NATIONS,

U.N. Doc. A/5407, March 29, 1963; and, Norman J. Padelford. Financing Peace-Keeping:
Politics & Crisis, in Norman J. Padelford and Leland M. Goodrich, eds., THE UNITED
NATIONS IN THE BALANCE: ACCOMPLISHMENTS & PROSPECTS (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, Inc., 1965) pp. 82-83.
3
For further information on the views of countries supporting this school of thought see
U.N.4 Monthly Chronicle, I, No. 5 (October 1964), pp. 50-56.
1d.
5
For details read, Certain Expenses of the United Nations, (Art. 17, para. 2, of the U.N.
CHARTER, Advisory Opinion of July 20, 1962; I.C.J. REPORTS, 1962, pp. 15 1-308.
6General Assembly Resolution 1854 (XVII), December 19, 1962, which was adopted by
a vote of 76 to 17, with 8 abstentions.
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Peace-Keeping Operations Involving Heavy Expenditures," which was
7
adopted by an overwhelming majority of the General Assembly, it must
be pointed out that followers of this school have not been able to convince
the other side of the legal soundness of their position. Debate between the
two camps continues without any signs of compromise. The legal issues
today seem more confused than ever.
Starting with the Korean and Suez operations and moving on to U.N.
involvement in the Congo and Cyprus, one thing becomes quite clear, that
now there is an urgent need for a greater understanding and clarity of legal
implications of international military actions. While much of the public
attention has been focused mainly upon the military and political aspects of
U.N. peace-keeping, the-past operations, particularly the Congo operation,
have given rise to many new legal developments and problems of Charter
interpretation which are still far from being resolved.
With the experience of these several U.N. operations one might have
thought that by this time the United Nations would have a solid legal
foundation on which to establish the most desirable kind of force needed
for any future crisis. But for two reasons this has not been possible:
Firstly, the existing political climate in the U.N. and elsewhere simply did
not permit past forces to be established under the most ideal or consensual
interpretations of the Charter concerning the use of force by the organization; and, secondly, the very fact that these forces were put together in
direct response to crisis situations, the legal authority of various U.N.
organs responsible for their creation has remained unclear and unsatisfactory up to the present time.
Because of this continued confusion and lack of consensus, resulting in
persistent stalemates, fresh and determined efforts must be made to liquidate the legacies of the past so-called "illegal" peace-keeping operations.
Relevant Charter provisions must be re-interpreted in the hope of possible
future meeting of minds between the various factions of U.N. membership
on the question of legal competence of various U.N. organs in the area of
peace-keeping activities. What follows in this article is just such an effort,
restricted to the re-definition of the legal competence of the two major
U.N. organs, namely the Security Council and the General Assembly in
the area of peace-keeping activities. It is hoped that this analysis will help
to alleviate some of the confusion which persists at the present time.

7

General Assembly Resolution 1854 (S-IV), June 27, 1963, which was adopted by a vote
of 92 in favor, II opposed, with 3 abstentions.
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Legal Competence of the Security Council in the
Area of Peace-Keeping Activities
Articles 24, 25 and 26 describe the functions of the Security Council
under the Charter of the United Nations. Specifically, the authority of the
Council to discharge these functions satisfactorily is granted in Chapters
VI, VII, VIII and XII. The Charter, under Article 24 (1) holds the
Security Council primarily responsible for the maintenance of international
peace and security. Under Article 26 it gives the Council further responsibility of working out plans, with the help of a Military Staff Committee, to
control and regulate military arrangements to be submitted to the member
states for approval.
Chapter VI of the Charter authorizes the Council to work out pacific
settlements of disputes, which, if not settled, may cause a breach in international peace and security. Certain United Nations observer groups
such as UNOGIL and the group in Yemen may be regarded as having
been established in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VI rather
than Chapter VII of the Charter.
It is submitted that whether these types of groups are considered as
organs for purposes of investigation under Article 34, or for broader
purposes of aiding in Security Council action under Chapter VI, is not of
much relevance to the authority of the Council to establish such groups.
The Security Council does have extremely broad powers under Chapter
VI, specifically under Article 34, which it can utilize by establishing a
subsidiary organ under Article 29. However, in either case the Council's
vote to operationalize these groups may not be procedural, even though the
vote to establish the subsidiary organ under Article 29 should be considered as procedural. Perhaps the distinction between Chapter VI and
Chapter VII, in relation to the Council's actions, would be that under
Chapter VI it would take recommendatory steps, whereas under Chapter
VII its action would be mandatory.8
Chapter VII of the United Natibns Charter is the most crucial chapter
for purposes of our discussion here. It deals with actions with respect to
threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. In other

SFor an excellent discussion of the authority of the Security Council on this point see
Kerley, The Powers of Investigation of the U.N. Security Council, AM. J. INT'L. L. 55

(1961), 892. Also, see the Report of the Sub-Committee of the Security Council established
under Resolution S/4216 of September 7, 1959 (S/4236), paras. 13-19: a group was set up
under Article 29 to proceed to Laos to check on a Laotian complaint of September 4, 1959
(Doc. S/4212 refers).
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words, it provides the means to fulfill those functions of the Council which
are not covered in Chapter VI relative to pacific settlement of disputes.
Article 39 states that the Security Council "shall determine the existence of any threats to peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression and
shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international
peace and security." Article 41 provides that the Security Council "may
decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be
employed to give effect to its decisions ... These may include complete or
partial interruption of economic relations and of ... communications, and
the severance of diplomatic relations." Article 42 goes further than Article
41 in stating:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article
41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such
action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations,
blockade and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of
United Nations.
The wording of Article 39 suggests that it is possible for the Council to
recommend that a United Nations force be set up, without necessarily
having to decide upon such measures for which provision is made in
Articles 44 and 42. A number of scholars have argued that in the case of
the Korean operation, the determination of the existence of a breach of
peace was implicitly made under Article 39, and consequently the use of
force was recommended. For the same reason, it is further argued, that this
caused the Korean operation to be undertaken by States on a voluntary
basis and not by the United Nations itself.9
The importance of Article 39 as having inherent power to establish a
U.N. military force, becomes more significant when one considers the fact
that the organization has been unable to take any action under Article 42,
because attempts under Article 43 to get the member states to agree on a
procedure of making national armed forces available to the Security Council have, so far, largely failed. 10 Here the Soviet Union and the communist
9
For further details on this point see the position of L. Goodrich, Korea: Collective
Measures Against Aggression, INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION, No. 494 (1953). The fact that
the Unified Command of the operation was delegated to the United States also confuses this
view. As regards the importance of Article 39 to this operation, consider, for instance, the
position of the delegate from the United Kingdom who was among those who argued that by
itself Article 39 is a sufficient basis for the establishment of an international military force to
restore international peace and security. OFF. REC., S.C., 5th yr., 476th mtg., pp. 3-4.
10 A further elaboration of this point can be found in BOWETT, UNITED NATIONS FORCES:
A LEGAL STUDY, New York: F. A. Praeger, 1964, pp. 12- 18;GOODRICH AND SIMONS, THE
UNITED

NATIONS AND

THE

MAINTENANCE

OF

INTERNATIONAL

PEACE

AND

SECURITY

(1955), pp. 398-405; and Blaisdell, Arms for the United Nations, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DOCUMENTS AND STATE PAPERS, 1 (1948), 141- 158.
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states point out that the result of the non-implementation of Article 43 is
the inability on the part of the Council to establish an international military
force, for the reason that Articles 42 and 43 are essentially related. They
also deny the ability of the Council to establish a force under Article 39.
Several other members do not accept this limitation which the Soviets
place upon Article 39, but agree on the interrelationship of Articles 42 and
43.11 It is interesting to note, however, that the Soviet Union has not been
consistent in its position. For example, in 1956 it appealed to all members
insisting that "in accordance with Article 42 ...all States members of the
United Nations ...should give military aid and other assistance to the
Republic of Egypt.' x2 Also, as Seyersted points out, the Soviet Union did
not object to the Security Council resolution under which ONUC was
established.1 3 While it is correct to state that ONUC was not set up under
the terms of Article 42, it nevertheless was established outside the framework of Article 43.14 Bowett, for instance, points out:
While the wording of Article 39 does not seem to necessitate that recommendations thereunder refer to Articles 41 and 42, it equally seems untenable
to argue that Article 42 can only be applied on the basis of agreements
concluded under Article 43. The wording of Article 42 is broad, leaving open
both the method of recruiting the Forces and the precise nature of their
command. The absence of agreements under Article 43 merely ensures that
States cannot be compelled to contribute to United Nations action under
Article 42; but action under Article 42 may be recommended by the Security
Council, pursuant to a finding under Article 39. Some evidence to the contrary is perhaps presented by Article 106 of the Charter, which stipulates that
'pending the coming into force' of the special arrangements in Article 43, the
parties to the Four-Power Declaration of 1943 and France shall consult
together 'with a view to such joint action on behalf of the Organization as
may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and
security.' It is, however, generally accepted that Article 106 was intended to
be of a temporary nature, and that the failure to implement
Article 43 cannot
15
be said to have extended indefinitely its implementation.'
It is interesting to note that Sohn agrees with Bowett on the breadth of
the wording of Article 43 as regards the method of recruitment and the
precise nature of the command of the force, and suggests that only the use

"For a comprehensive discussion of the Soviet position on this point, see

THE CONFER-

1962 (FNDC/P.V. 55), pp.
55-66. For an understanding of the positions taken by other member states in support of the
Soviet2 position, see OFF. REC. 5th yr., 476th Meeting.
l See REPERTORY OF PRACTICE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, Suppl. 1956-58, p. 172.
13
Finn Seyersted, United Nations Forces: Some Legal Problems, BRIT. Y.B. INT'L. L.
37 (1961),
439.
14
U.N. DoCs. S/4387 and CERTAIN EXPENSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE PLEADINGS (1962), p. 270.
5
1 BoWETT,op. Cit., supra, note 10, p. 277.
ENCE OF EIGHTEEN

NATIONS, COMMITTEE
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of national contingents depends on the conclusion of special agreements
which must be made under Article 43 prior to the establishment of the
force. 16 Seyersted also follows the same line of argument, and points out
that all that one can infer from Article 43 is that contingents of the national
armed forces cannot be compelled to fight on behalf of the United Nations
without prior understanding and agreements with the nation-state. However, in Seyersted's view, their services under Article 42 could be accepted
by the organization if the same were offered by member states as a result of
a recommendation under Atricle 39.17 As regards the temporary nature of
Article 106 as pointed out by Bowett, there seems to be a general agreement in the literature. 18
Turning to the main point made by Bowett in the preceding quotation, it
can be concluded with some assurance that a United Nations military force
can be established if recommended simply under Article 39, or if recommended under Article 39 with reference to Article 42. Halderman points
out that the authority "to recommend" has two distinct aspects in the
language of international law: one is substantive and the other is procedural. The Council may "recommend," under Article 39, that certain measures be carried out, e.g., Korea; or once it has been decided as to what
collective measures are going to be taken, the procedure may be adopted of
using recommendations to carry them out.' 9
Also, it can further be argued that legally a decision could be made
under Article 39 to establish a force under Article 42 by means of recruitment on an individual and voluntary basis, without necessarily violating
Article 43. However, the political response from member states to a direct
recruitment of individuals is bound to be negative. If a force were established under Article 42, subsequent to a finding under Article 39, it would
definitely be a force of a military nature.
However, it should be noted that there is nothing in Article 42 which
makes it necessary for the force established within its meaning to apply
military sanctions against a state; it merely points to the fact that military
means may be used to see that international peace and security is maintained or restored. In short, if an international military force were established under Article 42, this does not automatically imply that a state or a
number of states have been branded as aggressors and a combat involving
16L. B. Sohn, The Authority of the United Nations to Establish and Maintain a Permanent
Force, AM. J. INT'L. L., 52 (1958), 230.
17
Seyersted, op. cit., supra, note 13 at 439-440.
' 8See J. W. HaIderman, Legal Basis for United Nations Armed Forces, AM. J. INT'L. L.
56, No.
19 4 (1962), 985.
1d., at 987.
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United Nations forces is to follow. The broad wording of Article 42 has
induced scholars such as Seyersted and Jennings to believe that the
ONUC, for considerable periods of time, was operating under the authority of Article 42.20 It is submitted that the Congo Operation of United
Nations Forces was perhaps the most complicated operation ever undertaken by the international organization. It raises a number of legal questions which have caused a great deal of controversy.
It is also possible to find some constitutional basis for the establishment
of United Nations forces within the meaning of Article 41 of the Charter.
Article 41 provides: "The Security Council may decide what measures not
involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its
decisions ... these may include ... the severance of diplomatic relations."
On the basis of these provisions it is submitted that the Security Council
can legally decide that a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or an act
of aggression has occurred under the provisions of Article 39, and establish
a force with largely interposition functions in order to stabilize the situation, without resorting to enforcement measures. Bowett and a number of
other scholars feel that the right of such an interposition of "barrier" force
to use arms in self-defense would not legally violate its basic posture of a
21
non-combat force.
It is interesting to note that at one time or another, Article 41 has
presumably been conceded actually to provide a constitutional basis even
for enforcement action. On the other hand, a number of scholars and
possibly the Secretary-General as well, have relied on its broad wording to
include some other operations not involving the use of military forces or
any military sanctions. It has been suggested by Schachter, for instance,
that the technical aid given to the Congo by the United Nations was
regarded "as a means to strengthen the government of the country and to
improve internal conditions and.., these, in turn, would directly reduce
the risk of external intervention. One might conceivably regard such mea-

sures as within the broad language of Article 41

..

"22

Though the Secretary-General never regarded Article 41 as the main
source of his constitutional powers with regard to the Congo operation,
2

0
Seyersted, op. cit., supra, note 13 at 446.. However, the author admits that it is rather
difficult to use Article 42 as the basis for the establishment of ONUC. In an article entitled
"The United Nations Force and the Congo," The Listener, October 19, 1961, Jennings also
seems2 1 to agree with Seyersted.
BOWETT, op. cit., supra, note 10 at 279. Also see, Schwarzenberger, Report on
Problems of a U.N. Force Hamburg: INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION PUBLICATIONS
1960,22p. 7.
Schacter, Legal Aspects of United Nations Action in the Congo, AM. J. INT'L. L. 55,
No. 1 (1961), 6.
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there is sufficient evidence to suggest that on a number of occasions he has
referred to this Article in connection with the Congo operation. 23 In conclusion, it can be pointed out that Article 41 does provide some constitutional basis for a United Nations military force with functions of
interposition or at least an observer group. However, Sohn, while agreeing
with the preceding statement, cautions that too much emphasis upon this
Article will divert attention from Articles 39, 40 or 42 which provide much
24
better constitutional bases for Security Council action.
Turning to Article 40 of the Charter, it seems that there exists some
constitutional basis for the establishment of an international military force.
Article 40 says: "In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the
Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding
upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or
desirable

. .

." Stone argues that the wording of this Article can be implied

to mean some sort of "provisional" measures which may well mean either
supervision or enforcement of truces, cease-fire orders or interim injunctions on the supply and introduction of more weapons and fresh troops
25
by international military forces.
Sohn agrees with Stone and further suggests that once it has' been
established by the United Nations, under Article 39, expressly or implicitly, that a threat to peace, a breach of peace or an act of aggression has
taken place, then there is no reason why an international military force
cannot be established under Article 40, should it become clear that some
provisional measures are necessary to restore international peace and security. 26 In view of the above comments, it can fairly be concluded that a
majority of United Nations Observer Groups so far established by the
organization may owe their legal existence to the provisions of Article 40.
It is further concluded that the interposition forces may also be regarded as
provisional measures, and thus may find a legal case for their establishment
in the authority of Article 40.
Article 40 raises a number of difficulties in interpretation. For example,
it authorizes the Council to "call upon" the parties concerned to comply
with provisional measures, and does not make it clear as to how far the
"call" imposes legal obligations on the parties concerned to comply with
23

0FF. REC., S. C., 15th yr., 884th Meeting, para. 26. The Secretary-General to whom
reference
is here made is Dag Hammarskjold.
24
Sohn, op. cit., supra, note 16 at 230.
2J. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT, New York: Rinehart Publishers, 1954; With Supplement: London: Stevens & Sons, 1959. Pp. 643-647.
26
Sohn, op. cit., supra, note 16 at 230.
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that call. It is conceivable that this Article will probably be used in situations in which a threat to the peace or a breach of peace exists, but it is
hard to agree that it will be an appropriate or an effective measure in
situations in which an aggression has been committed and a call upon the
aggressor to cease fire goes unheeded. In a situation such as this, it seems
more reasonable to argue that a call from the Security Council for "provisional action" would almost certainly have to mean "preventive action"
within the meaning of Article 2(5), and that means all member states would
be required to "refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the
United Nations is taking preventive ... action."
The question raised in the preceding paragraph, regarding the legally
binding obligation of "call upon" the members by the Security Council is
an interesting one. For instance, Kelsen contends that the Security Council
always had the legal option of using the "call" under Article 40 either as a
simple recommendation or a legally binding decision, for, as far as the
language is concerned, it falls between "recommendations" in Chapter VI,
and "deciding on measures" in Chapter VII.27 Along the same lines, Stone
also argues that Article 41 is a part of Chapter VII, and that if the Security
Council wishes, it may treat action taken under this Article as binding. 28
Schacter seems to agree with Kelsen and Stone in suggesting that the
stipulation in the last sentence of the Article, "The Security Council shall
duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures,"
confirms the view held by these two scholars. 29 It is interesting to note that
during the Congo operation, both the Secretary-General and the Security
Council insisted that the "calls" made under Article 40 were legally binding, and as a result invoked the application of Articles 25 and 40 of the
30
Charter.
In view of the above, it may fairly be concluded that Article 40 in fact
does provide a constitutional basis for the establishment of a United
Nations military force, preferably, as a subsidiary organ of the Council,
largely for the purposes of supervision of provisional measures applied by
the Security Council under Article 40. It may further be concluded that
when the Security Council wishes to make these measures mandatory,
these "calls" could be regarded as decisions of the Council to which
Articles 2(5), 25 and 49 will be applicable, and thus all countries
(non-members included) will be required to promote the purposes of the
27

KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS,

London: Stevens & Sons, 1950, p. 740.
Stone, op. cit., supra, note 25 at 220.
29Schachter, Legal Aspects of the United Nations Action in the Congo, op. cit., supra,
28

note 22 at 60.
30

U.N. Doc. S/4417/Add. 6, August 12, 1960.
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United Nations Forces. After having said this, it should, however, be
admitted that given the political climate of the present day, it is unlikely
that there will be too many occasions in which the United Nations would
choose to rely on Article 40.
It has been suggested previously that perhaps the most controversial
military operation ever carried out by the U.N. forces was the Congo
operation. It may be stated here that the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on "Certain Expenses of the United Nations"
made no attempt to support the view that the constitutional basis for the
establishment of ONUC were to be found in Article 40. Rather, it took the
position that it was not necessary, to reach the Opinion of the Court, that
there be reference to a specific Article in the case of UNEF or ONUC.
The Court did offer the broad view that various Resolutions passed on
ONUC were within the constitutional framework of Chapter VII of the
Charter, though this should not be taken to mean that the Resolutions
constituted enforcement measures. 31 The position taken by dissenting
Judge Quintana highlights the controversy. The Judge says:
Any use of armed force intended for whatever purpose implies by definition enforcement action [and that] when there have been dead and wounded,
bombardments on both sides, when civilian populations have paid the price,
when a cease-fire and other military agreements have been negotiated between two belligerent groups, it32is not easy to evade the conclusion that this
constitutes enforcement action.

In its Advisory Opinion, the Court did not clearly go so far as to say that
ONUC fell within the scope of Article 40 but left the point open.
Another dissenting judge, Koretsky, also took the position that Article
40 cannot be applicable in the case of ONUC, and insisted that it is very
"closely connected to Articles 41 and 42 through Article 39," and therefore subject to agreement under Article 43.33
Turning to paragraph I of Article 48 of the Charter, it has been suggested by at least a few scholars that it might contain some independent
constitutional basis for the establishment of an international military force
of sorts. Paragraph 1 of this Article reads: "The action required to carry
out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the members of the
United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may deter-mine." An analysis of this provision does not seem to make a very convincing case for the establishment of a force simply under the authority of
3

1.C..J
REPORTS, 1962, at 166.

32
1d.,
33

at 246.
1d., at 275.
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this paragraph. It seems more logical to argue that Article 48, paragraph 1,
is merely regulating the nature and the intent of participation of various
countries in an action which has already been taken by the Council under
some other article or articles.
Article 48(1) could regulate the implementation of a decision -for a
United Nations Force, but not provide the actual basis for its establishment. It is interesting to note that the same view has been taken by the
Soviet Union in connection with its position of nonpayment of its share of
ONUC expenses. The Soviet Union accepts the fact that the Resolution of
July 13, 1960, which authorized the establishment of ONUC was legally
valid, but, because the Secretary-General and not the Security Council [as
it should have under Article 48(1)] provided the list of states participating
in ONUC, the implementation of the Resolution was thus rendered illegal. 3 4 However, it is submitted that while on the basis of the Court's
observation the particular Soviet interpretation of Article 48(1) can be
rejected, the main premise upon which this interpretation (that this particular provision does not provide legal basis for the establishment of a force)
was based must be regarded as valid.
At least one scholar has argued that Article 29 itself provides a satisfactory legal basis to establish a force as a subsidiary organ to the Security
Council.3 6 Article 29 of the Charter provides that "the Security Council
may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions." It is conceivable that a U.N. force may certainly be considered a subsidiary organ of the Council, but it is unthinkable
that it could be created by a simple procedural vote, which is all that would
be required if this Article were to be applied. This point can also be
supported by the Court's Opinion. It may be noted that the Court in its
Advisory Opinion in the "Expenses Case" did not rely on this Article, but
leaned on more substantive Articles of the Charter.

Legal Competence of the General Assembly in the
Area of Peace-Keeping Activities
It has been contended that an analysis of the United Nations Charter
would reveal the fact that there are a number of provisions in the Charter
authorizing the General Assembly to establish an international military
34

Certain Expenses of the United Nations, I.C.J. READINGS, 1962, at 272 and 400.
Draper, The Legal Limitation upon the Employment of Weapons by the United
Nations Force in the Congo, INT'L. & COMp. L. Q., 12 (1963), 392. Draper's contention ir
this article has been that the constitutional basis of UNEF may be found in Article 29.
38
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force under certain situations. A brief analysis of these provisions is proposed here to determine the validity vel non of this contention.
Article 10 of the Charter states:
The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within
the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of
any organs provided for it in the present Charter, and, except as provided in
Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United
Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or
matters.
The provisions of Article 12 to which reference is made above provide:
While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or
situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General
Assembly shall not make any recommendations with regard to that dispute or
situation unless the Security Council so suggests.
It is submitted that despite the fact that this provision of Article 12 tends
to curtail the powers of the General Assembly, Article 10 can still be
interpreted as giving broad powers to the General Assembly.
Article 11(1) also seems somewhat relevant, to the extent that it provides a legal basis for the Assembly to work out an a priori set of principles
which could be applied to an international military force established at a
later date. This article provides:
The General Assembly may consider the general principles of cooperation
in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may
make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to
the Security Council or to both.
There is nothing, however, in this provision which would imply that a
recommendation is being made to the members that they provide a specified military force to the United Nations. 37 Article 11(2) seems more
relevant to this concept. It states:
The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of
the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a state which is not a
Member of the United Nations in accordance which Article 35, paragraph 2,
and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations with
regard to any such questions to the state or states concerned or to the
Security Council or to both. Any such question for which action is necessary
shall be referred to the Security Council or the General Assembly either
before or after discussion.
It gives a clear mandate to the Assembly to discuss any question which it
feels related to the maintenance of international peace and security, and
37

1n support of this statement, see Sohn, op. cit., supra, note I I at 231.
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make recommendations, with, of course, the exception contained in Article
12.
The principles and the purposes of the Charter are of course laid down
in Articles I and 2. The most pertinent part of these Articles in relation to
the present discussion is Article 2(4) which spells out the most fundamental prohibition of the threat or actual use of force. Article 2(4) reads: "All
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations."
Sohn contends that a dynamic interpretation of Article 22 may also be
taken legally, to sustain at least an interposition force. That Article states:
"The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems
necessary for the performance of its functions." Sohn goes on to point out:
Once ... it has been accepted that mediators or commissions, appointed by
the Assembly to supervise a truce agreement or the observance of the
Resolutions of the Assembly, might need additional personnel for the exercise of their functions, there seems to be no logical limit to the number of
persons needed. Similarly, if military personnel are added to United Nations
missions and guards are sent to defend the personnel and the property of such
missions, it is difficult to draw the line between permitted and prohibited
types of personnel ... as
It can, however, be suggested that Article 22 was perhaps originally
intended to cover non-military bodies such as commissions or committees
which would probably assist the Assembly in carrying out its investigative,
deliberative and quasi-legislative functions adequately. In fact, it is further
suggested that there is sufficient evidence in the literature to contend that
Article 22 cannot per se support establishment of an international force
without first making a convincing case that the functions of the force will in
fact fall within the legally authorized powers of the General Assembly
through Articles 10, 11, or 14. The findings of the International Court of
Justice with regard to the establishment of the Administrative Tribunal of
the United Nations under Article 22 can be quoted in support of this
statement. The International Court found that the General Assembly had
the authority to create this Tribunal for the effective implementation of the
provisions of Article 107 of the Charter with regard to regulations of the
United Nations staff.3 9 For further support of this view with regard to
Article 22, scholars such as Andrassy and Kelsen can also be quoted. 40
38

at 234.
Effects of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal,
I.C.J. REPORTS 1954, p. 7 1.
4
1See Andrassy in Report on Problems of a U.N. Force, INTERNATIONAL LAW AssociATION (Hamburg Conference, 1960), p. 8, No. 206; also see Kelsen, op. cit. supra note 27 at
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General Assembly and the
Uniting-for-Peace Resolution
After the outbreak of hostitilities in Korea, the General Assembly
passed a resolution pointing out that the members of the Security Council
had largely failed to uphold its responsibilities to the members of the
United Nations by excessive use of the veto provisions, and by not being
able to implement Article 43. Section A of the Resolution is pertinent to
the present discussion, for it resolves, as Bowett quotes it, that
if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity among the Permanent
Members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security in any case where there "appears to be threat
to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, the General Assembly
shall consider the matter immediately with a view of making appropriate
recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case
of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when
necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security. Section A
also provides for the calling of an emergency
meeting of the Assembly,
41
should it not be in session at that time.
It is submitted that the main force of the argument as contained in the
wording of Section A of the Uniting-for-Peace Resolution, amounts to
saying that the General Assembly may do by recommendation almost
anything it wishes that the Security Council was authorized to do under the
constitutional provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter. The Soviet Union
and a number of other countries have consistently denied this, and refer to
Articles 11(2), 24, 43 and 47 in support of their contention that those
matters which concern use of force are under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Security Council.
In support of the Uniting-for-Peace Resolution, a number of points can
be made. First of all, reference can be made to the Advisory Opinion of the
International Court on the "Expenses Case." The Court, during the course
of its Opinion, chose to interpret the term "action" as embodied in Article
11(2) to mean "enforcement action." This view, according to Bowett,
indicates:
that the Assembly is free to undertake many other types of action without
referring to the Security Council, it also implies that it may never, even by

recommendation, undertake enforcement action. It is possible that the Court
did not intend to convey this impression, and the point is not directly germane
to its conclusions on the matter of expenses. It does, nevertheless, only

mention the authority of the Assembly to take "action" under Article 11(2)
41
Cited by BOWETT, op. cit. supra, note 10 at 290-291. For a substantive examination of
the Uniting-for-Peace Resolution, and its compatibility with the functions and procedures of
the General Assembly, see Andrassy, Uniting for Peace, AM. J. INT'L. L. 50 (1956),
574-578.
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when this involves the Organization of "peace-keeping"
operations, at the
42
request, or the consent, of the states concerned.
It is interesting to note that throughout its opinion, the Court made no
reference to the right of the General Assembly to recommend enforcement
measures either under the Charter or under the Resolution, and consequently, does not uphold any such right of the Assembly, which might
presumably have been drawn from the Uniting-for-Peace Resolution. On
the other hand, it emphasizes repeatedly that the right to order coercive
measures is restricted only to the Security Council. As a matter of fact, the
Court consciously avoids any reference to the Uniting-for-Peace Resolution.
In support of the Uniting-for-Peace Resolution, it has also been suggested that while Article 24 gives the Council primary responsibility for
maintaining international peace and security, but not the exclusive responsibility. Consequently, it can be argued that the Assembly does have
secondary or residual responsibility in this area as indicated by Articles 10,
11 and 14. This view of secondary responsibility of this Resolution under
Article 24(1) is acceptable to a substantial number of scholars in the body
of the relevant literature. It is also acceptable to the International Court of
Justice provided no reference is made to the provisions of the Uniting4
for-Peace Resolution in this connection. A
After recognizing the fact that the General Assembly has a secondary
responsibility in the maintenance of peace and security, it seems logical to
pursue this line of thought further, and to refer to Article 12, which
provides guidelines to the conduct of the General Assembly with the
Security Council, in relation particularly to resolutions such as the Uniting-for-Peace Resolution. Under the directives of this Article, it becomes
apparent that the Assembly may make no recommendations whatsoever on
a question with regard to which the Security Council is exercising its
functions. An exception to this rule would be a request by the Council
itself for a recommendation. However, there is nothing in this Article
which would suggest that the Assembly must refrain from even discussing
a subject while it is being dealt with by the Council, or that a unanimous
vote of all the permanent members of the Council is required before the
Council could make a request to the Assembly for a recommendation on
the subject.
With the above explanation it can be concluded that this particular
42
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provision of the Uniting-for-Peace Resolution which states that the General Assembly can convene in an emergency session on the vote of any seven
members when the Council "fails to exercise its primary responsibility for
the maintenance of international peace and security," seems therefore to be
compatible with the terms of the Charter of the United Nations.
Another provision of the Resolution which states that the General Assembly may call an emergency session of its body by the approval of a
simple majority of the members of the United Nations, cannot also be
considered against the terms of the Charter. This is because it would
simply not occur until the Security Council had failed to discharge its
primary responsibility toward the maintenance of international peace and
order, and the secondary responsibility of the General Assembly as implied
by Article 24(1) has come into effect.
It has also been argued by a number of member states that until the
Secretary-General formally informs the General Assembly that the Security Council is deadlocked and is unable to act on a particular subject,
the Assembly may make no recommendations on this subject. The support
for this argument is largely drawn from the provisions of Article 12(2)
which stipulates that the Secretary-General keep the General Assembly
informed constantly on the progress being made by the Council on all
matters relating to peace and security. According to Bowett, a more logical
view of this point would be:
[P]aragraph 2 of Article 12 is concerned with procedure, and not substance. It provides the appropriate procedure for keeping the Assembly
informed of the work of the Council, but the test for whether the Council has
actually ceased to deal with a matter is by interpretation of Article 12(l), and
not by notification by the Secretary-General. Whether the Council is ex44
ercising its function cannot depend upon mere formality.
It is therefore concluded that the Uniting-for-Peace Resolution does not
violate the limits of authority which is granted to the General Assembly by
the United Nations Charter in the area of recommending military operations, if these operations are only "peace-keeping," and not "enforcement" operations directed against an aggressor state involving active combat. It is interesting to note that the Resolution does reserve the use of
military force for breaches of peace and acts of aggression, although it will
44BoWETr, op. cit. supra, note 10 at 292. In support of Bowett's view see also
Andrassy, Uniting for Peace, op. cit. supra, note 41 at 568-569. Andrassy argues that just

because a subject is not being considered by the Security Council at a given time is not
conclusive for the General Assembly, where the subject has been found deliberately to
require a delay, e.g., in order to explore the possibilities of achieving an accord between the
disagreeing parties. That such a delay would be appropriate in cases covered in Article 39 is
unlikely.
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be recalled that Article 39 clearly states that it is the Secpurity Council
which shall determine a "threat to the peace, breach of peace, or act of
aggression," and Article 42 states that the Council may recpmmend military measures if such a situation is found to have arisen.
Kelsen and a number of other scholars argue that the U.N. Charter gives
only to the Security Council the express authority to make such a finding,
that the General Assembly can not even claim to possess such powers by
inference. 45 Bowett, however, disagrees with Kelsen's and Goodrich's
views and contends:
The right of the Council was only specifically enunciated in order to make
clear the conditions for the operation of Article 42, and there was no need for
such enunciation in the case of the Assembly, as it possesses no binding
authority equivalent to that of Article 42. The opinion that in any event the
Assembly has no need to make such a finding before recommending the use
of force is also to be doubted-it can hardly be allowed more freedom in the
field of military measures than the Security Council. Under part A of the
Uniting-for- Peace Resolution is to be assumed therefore that the General
Assembly will determine the existence of a breach 46of the peace or act of
aggression before recommending collective measures.
Provision was also made, in the Uniting-for-Peace Resolution, to give
the military and technical details for collective enforcement measures, in
order to insure that the United Nations should be capable of establishing
and operating an international military force without delay. Parts C and D
of the Resolution provide details and guidelines for the enforcement measures envisaged under part A of the Resolution. Part C makes an appeal to
all members of the United Nations to declare the nature 4 nd scope of
assistance which they will be willing to make available in response to a
recommendation by the General Assembly. It also encourage§ them to
train and earmark some of their troops for duty with the international
military forces.
Further, a request is made to the Secretary-General to appoint a papel of
military advisors. In view of these provisions, it seems reasonal~le to
conclude that some constitutional basis, under certain circumstances, may
exist for the establishment of a U.N. force under the provisions of part A
of the Uniting-for-Peace Resolution, which can be implemented under the
provisions of part C. In fact, one can go so far as to argue that part C of the

45For a detailed explanation of Kelsen's position, see KELSEN, RECENT TRENDS IN THE
NATIONS, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963, pp. 978-980.
Goodrich also supports Kelsen's position. See Goodrich,Development of the General Assembly, INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION, No. 471 (1951), 266- 275.
46BOWETT, op. cit., supra, note 10 at 293. Andrassy, too, seems to disagree with
Bowett's position. Op. cit supra, note 41 at 578.
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Resolution in fact falls within the scope of Article 11(1), further
re-enforced by Article 2(5) and the Preamble of the Charter itself.
The Resolution also establishes a Collective Measures Committee of
fourteen members under the provisions of its part D. The main task of the
committee at the time was to consult with the member states and the
Secretary-General, and to report on methods (including those in part C)
"which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and
security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter,
taking account of collective self-defense and regional arrangements (Arti'47
cles 5 1 and 52 of the Charter)."
In the final analysis, it is important to remember that these provisions of
the Resolution, in fact the entire Resolution itself, is to be put into operation only if the Security Council has failed to function. It is submitted that
the passage of the Resolution in no way relieves the Security Council of its
primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security. Besides, the permanent members of the Council always have the option to
implement Article 43. It is pointed out that there is nothing in the Charter
which would forbid the United Nations members from training and earmarking contingents of their armed forces for possible future service with
the United Nations.
It is further to be noted that the Resolution adds nothing significantly
new to the provisions of Article 11(1). A number of scholars have suggested at one time or another, that in fact both the Assembly and the
Council, under the provisions of paragraph 8 of the Uniting-for-Peace
Resolution, can make separate recommendations to the United Nations as
a whole for the establishment of an international military force, using any
method of reeommendation which they prefer.48
Generally speaking, it seems unnecessary to place too much reliance
upon the Resolution with regard to a matter on which the Council finds
itself unable to act. If the Council wishes to relieve itself completely of the
responsibility in a certain matter, it need merely drop that matter from its
agenda altogether. If it feels it has pressing reasons to retain the matter on
its agenda (as in the case of the Congo), it can do so by using Article 20.
Obviously, there is no use for implementing the Resolution in situations in
471For details see Report of the Collective Measures Committee (1951), U.N. Doc.
A/ 189
1.
48
1n support of the above statement, see Schwarzenberger, Problems of a United Na-
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which the Security Council prefers to send the matter to the Assembly
voluntarily.
It can be further said that, by and large, in actual practice, those provisions of the Resolution which allow for the establishment of an international military force have been avoided. In fact, it can be argued that
to date the Resolution has not provided the authority for the establishment
of any force. The principle of "consent" and reliance on Articles 11, 14
and 40 has been preferred. In view of this, it can be concluded that the
only major use of the Resolution so far has been to call emergency sessions
of the Assembly under its provisions.

Conclusion
It is admitted that the legal problems associated with the United Nations
intervention in an international crisis may be regarded as secondary to the
problems of political consensus among the conflicting member states with
regard to the desirability of a U.N. intervention, in the first place, and the
extent of intervention, in the second place. One can go a step further and
state that even most legal problems, in the final analysis, have political
foundations.
But it would be folly to ignore the fact that once such a consensus has
withered after the initial establishment of a peace-keeping operation, or if it
never existed (as has been the case in most instances), the disillusioned
states never fail to raise constitutional objections to the authority of the
Secretary-General, the mandate of the force under consideration, and most
importantly, the legal competence of the U.N. organ responsible for initiating the establishment of the force in the first place.
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